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Southern African countries have been experienced several problems regarding the 
management of their river basins. In order to mitigate these problems, during the past 15 
years, most of the SADC countries have adopted comprehensive reforms in the water 
sector towards decentralization of river basin management through changing water 
related institutions. However, the impact of those institutions on decentralization process 
of river basin management is still largely unknown. Understanding the impact of 
institutions on decentralization process of river basin management could be of important 
value for policy makers and water managers. This paper analyses the impact of 
institutional factors on river basin decentralization process and its performance. The 
paper uses an institutional economic framework, where institutional factors are broken 
down into contextual factors and initial conditions; characteristics of decentralization 
process; characteristics of central government/basin-level relationships and capacities; 
and internal configuration of basin level institutional arrangements. The impact of the 
institutional reforms on decentralization process and performance of river basin 
management is studied by accessing the level of decentralization of Limpopo 
(Mozambique), Inkomati (South Africa) and Mzingwane (Zimbabwe) river basins given 
the institutional factors in the respective countries. The study uses secondary data 
collected from different sources and primary data collected from a survey conducted in 
the three river basins in the studied countries. The analysis show mixed results. While the 
Inkomati river basin is more decentralized, the decentralization process of Mzingwane 
and Limpopo river basins is lagging behind. Institutional factors showed to be 
determinants in river basin decentralization process and its performance. The 
advancement of decentralization process and its performance in Inkomati river basin is 
associated with the endowment of financial capacity as well as the involvement of river 
basin stakeholders in decentralization process, while the failure of decentralization 
process in Mzingwane and Limpopo river basins is mainly associated with top-down 
approaches used in decentralization process in these basins as well as the lack of financial 
endowment. 
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Sub Saharan countries have been experiencing serious problems regarding the 
management of their river basins. Such problems include inequality in access to water, 
limited financial and capacity at national and basin levels for river basin management, 
poor river basin infrastructure and service delivery, declining quality and quantity of the 
river basin natural resources, limited stakeholders involvement in the basin management, 
institutional fragmentation, conflicting sector policies, impacts of recurrent 
droughts/floods and increasing number of conflicts among stakeholders (Swatuk, 2005). 
In order to address these problems, during the past 25 years, most Sub Saharan African 
countries have adopted a comprehensive reform in the water sector towards integrated 
water resources management (IWRM). Decentralization of water management is one of 
the key reform items contained in the concept of Integrated Water Resource Management 
(IWRM), and most Sub Saharan countries have adopted it (Sokile, Mwaruvanda and van 
Koppen, 2005). This study use a sample of three Southern African selected river basins, 
Inkomati in South Africa, Limpopo (Mozambican part) in Mozambique, under the 
responsibility of the ARA-Sul agency, and Mzingwane (which is the Zimbabwean 
component of Limpopo) in Zimbabwe to outlook water governance and decentralization 
process in Sub Saharan river basins.  
For example, the South Africa’s National Water Act (NWA) approved in 1998 created 
new organizational setups in river basin management through the creation of Catchment 
Management Agencies (CMAs), and more locally by the establishment of Water Users 
Associations (WUAs). Similar to South Africa, Zimbabwe repealed the 1976 Water Act 
and initiated the design of laws and policies towards decentralization of water 
management. In 1998, the Zimbabwean government promulgated the Water Act and the 
Zimbabwe National Water Authority (ZINWA) Act. The new Acts created new 
organizational setups through the creation of catchment and sub-catchment councils to 
manage seven major river basins (Save, Sanyati, Mazowe, Runde, Mzingwane, Gwayi 
and Manyame) identified in the country.  
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Likewise, Mozambique approved the first National Water Law in 1991 (DNA, 1999). 
The same law established the National Water Council for inter-sector coordination and 
five Regional Water Administration Agencies (ARAs) to manage regional river basins. 
The five ARAs are ARA-Sul, ARA-Zambeze, ARA-Centro, ARA-Centro Norte and 
ARA-Norte. Furthermore, the Mozambican government approved the national water 
policy in 1995 (DNA, 2007). This revised legal framework allowed leaders of local 
communities to be involved in all stages of water supply projects, in order to express 
community’s needs, desires and preferences in the selection of the type and level of 
services required, and the form of investment in the water sector (DNA, 2001).  
 
As described above, reforms in the water sector towards the implementation of integrated 
water resources management (IWRM) in Mozambique, South Africa and Zimbabwe have 
substantially changed the institutional settings governing the water sector in these 
countries.  These settings  have been documented extensively within specific contexts 
and perspectives of other countries (Vermillion, 1997; Savedoff & Spiller, 1999; Challen, 
2000; Shirely, 2002 and Saleth & Dinar, 1999, 2000, 2004; 2009). However, there is no 
evidence of existing studies that use an institutional economics framework to understand 
the river basin decentralization process and its performance in Sub Saharan countries1.  
For example, Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) countries have adopted 
comprehensive institutional reforms in the water sector, recent studies that have been 
undertaken in Mozambique, South Africa and Zimbabwe present the organizational 
structure of water sector and review the policies that have been undertaken towards 
decentralization of water management (Magaia, 2009; Backeberg, 2005; Karar, 2002; 
Wester, 2003; Manzungu and Kujinga, 2002). However, the impact of these reforms on 
river basin decentralization process and its performance is still largely unknown. A cross-
country analysis which aims to understand the impacts of institutional factors on the 
dynamics of changes in river basin decentralization and its performance could be of 
important value for policy makers and water managers. From a policy and applied point 
                                                 
1 Saleth and Dinar (2000) analyzed the trends of decentralization process in South Africa and Backeberg 
(2005) described the water institutional reforms in South Africa. None of these studies evaluated river basin 
decentralization process and its performance  in South Africa using an institutional economic framework   
 3 
of view, this paper will highlight factors that affect the outcomes of decentralization 
process and its performance and give practical recommendations to governments and 
river basin stakeholders to what they must do to achieve integrated water resource 
management through decentralization.  
This paper aims to assess the river basin decentralization process and its performance 
under varying institutional setting in Mozambique, South Africa and Zimbabwe. The 
specific objectives of the paper are to: 
1. Describe the factors that are potentially related to the development of 
decentralized river basin management in Sub Saharan countries focusing in South 
Africa, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. 
2. Depict the factors that are potentially related to the performance of decentralized 
river basin management in Sub Saharan countries concentrating on South Africa, 
Mozambique and Zimbabwe. 
The paper is divided into six sections. The next section provides a literature review. The 
third section describes the analytical framework. The fourth presents the data collection 
method, empirical framework applied in the paper and the methods used for to analyze 
the data. The results are presented in the fifth section and section six highlights the 
conclusions derived from the studied river basins and their policy implications. 
2 Literature Review 
Decentralization2 of water resource management to the lowest appropriate level has 
become a major component of recent water reforms around the world.  Academics, policy 
makers and national and international donor agencies as well as non government 
organizations (NGOs) have all been working on water projects with decentralization 
components. Empirical evidence from river basins in the developed and developing world 
shows that decentralization of water management has determined tremendous 
achievements in conflict and pollution reduction, productive and allocative efficiency, 
and environmental sustainability (Blomquist, Calbick and Dinar 2005; Blomquist et al. 
2005a; 2005b; Blomquist, Tonderski and Dinar 2005; Dinar et al., 2005). Likewise, 
                                                 
2 Following Dinar et al. (2007) in this study decentralization is defined as the redistribution of power and 
allocation of resources with more authority being shifted away from the central government level to lower 
levels of government. 
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Wester, Burton and Mestre-Rodriguez (2001) in the Lerma-Chapala Basin, Mexico also 
noted that water governance decentralization led to sustainable water resource 
management, enhanced water services and integrated watershed management. 
Although decentralization of water management was reported to produce positive impact, 
some scholars argue that in various cases it has negative consequences. Stalgren (2006) 
argues that political entrepreneurs at the national level strategically position themselves 
by influencing the ‘construction of reality’ in matters of water governance 
decentralization at the local level to their advantage. Smith (1983) and Fesler (1968) also 
argue that decentralization promotes parochial and separatist tendencies and may deepen 
enclaves of authoritarianism as well as exacerbate inequalities. Kambudzi (1997) states 
that democratization of water may go beyond our intention and turnout to be a recipe for 
further disaster. Finally, Helmi (2001) showed through a study carried out in the 
Indonesian province of Central Kalimantan that decentralization processes at the national, 
district and village levels led to highly volatile socio-legal configurations that created 
insecurity. 
In the light of these mixed views on decentralization in water governance, it can be 
concluded that the outcome from the decentralization process of water management often 
depends on the manner in which the process is operationalised. Blomquist, Dinar and 
Kemper (2005) argue that the whole process of success or failure of decentralization is 
context specific as it can be affected not only by political will but also by a host of other 
interconnected factors that could be historical, legal, social, cultural, physical or 
institutional in nature.  
While for the Australian Murray-Darling basin (Blomquist et al., 2005b), the Brazilian 
Jaguaribe basin (Johnsson and Kemper, 2005) and the Indonesian Brantas basin 
(Blomquist, Ramu and Kemper, 2005) stakeholder involvement might have translated 
significantly into effective river basin management, in the Costa Rican basin of the 
Tarcoles and the Spanish basin of Guadalquivir, an interesting observation was made: in 
these two catchments decentralization was compromised significantly by translation of 
stakeholder participation into ‘stakeholder protectionism’ wherein a dominant group of 
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stakeholders use their numbers and privilege to participate to their selfish advantage.  For 
instance, in the Spanish Guadalquivir basin, irrigators constituted a significant number of 
the stakeholders and they consumed most of the water yet they were exempted from 
paying water tariffs (Blomquist et al., 2005c).  The same scenario prevailed in the Costa 
Rican Tarcoles basin where hydro-power producers made the most non-consumptive use 
of water yet they did not pay water tariffs (Blomquist et al. 2005a).  
While other issues are context specific, from the available international and local 
literature it seems that the majority of the cases of failure have communication problems 
at the core. Blomquist, Tonderski and Dinar (2005) state that the way in which 
communication regarding decentralization takes place is the key factor determining the 
outcome of decentralization process. Through their work in the Guadalquivir River 
Basin, Spain, they have noted that the decentralization process could have yielded good 
results if communication with key stakeholders was established (Blomquist et al., 2005c). 
In the same vein, Sithole (2000) and Manzungu (2001) report that in Zimbabwe, 
communication hampered effective participation by marginalizing groups through use of 
an alien (foreign) language, alien practices and information asymmetry. Additionally, 
being looked down upon as being ignorant by other better-off stakeholders modeled the 
context in which the marginalized groups were further marginalized in the Zimbabwean 
Lower Gwayi sub-catchment.  
2.1 Institutional Economic Approaches Applied to the Water Sector  
The common approach that has been used to analyze decentralization reforms of river 
basin management is the case study approach (Blomquist, Dinar and Kemper, 2005; Ioris, 
2001; Kemper and Olson, 2000). Studies that include quantitative analysis of river basin 
decentralization reforms are lacking except the work by Dinar et al. (2007) and Saleth 
and Dinar (2004). A detailed theoretical framework for analyzing water sector is 
described by Saleth and Dinar (2004), Blomquist, Dinar and Kemper (2005), Dinar et al. 
(2007) and Blomquist, Dinar and Kemper (2008). In this section we describe the 
theoretical institutional framework proposed by the above mentioned authors. 
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Saleth and Dinar (2004) use institutional decomposition and analysis (IDA) framework to 
analyze the performance of water sector.  Figure 1 below shows the factors which affect 
water sector performance based on IDA framework. The application of IDA framework 
is performed in four different steps. The first step is the definition of water sector, water 
institutions and water sector performance. Secondly, water institutions and water sector 
performance are decomposed to identify their major components.   
 
As shown in figure 1 below, the main components of water institutions are water law, 
water policy and water organizations. Within each component of water institutions are 
subcomponents. Saleth and Dinar (2004) identified four indicators of water sector 
performance as follows: (a) physical performance composed by the following sub 
indicators: demand-supply gap,  physical health of water infrastructure, conflict 
resolution efficiency and smoothness of water transfer across sectors, regions and users; 
(b) financial performance which made up of the following indicators: investment gap 
(actual vs. required) and financial gap (expenditure vs. cost recovery); (c) economic 
efficiency which is composed of the following sub indicators: price gap (water price vs. 
supply cost), incentive gap (actual water prices vs. scarcity value of water); and (d) equity 
performance which is composed by the following sub indicators: equity between regions, 





Figure 1. Factors affecting water sector performance and their interaction.  
Source: Adapted from Saleth and Dinar (2004)  
 
At the third stage, after the decomposition of water sector performance and water 
institutions, the analytical linkages among water institutional aspects are demonstrated 
and the influence of exogenous factors on institutional aspects and water sector 
performance is illustrated. Figure 1 above shows that water sector performance is 
affected by water institutions and other factors outside the water sector. The arrows show 
the interactions among water institutions, other factors outside water institutions and 
water sector performance. Some of these linkages have direct and immediate effect while 
others have indirect effects. At the last stage, specific variables are defined to represent 
institutional, performance and exogenous aspects. For a detail of institutional, 
performance and exogenous aspect variables which can be used in water sector, see 
Saleth and Dinar (2004). 
 
Blomquist, Dinar and Kemper (2005); Dinar et al. (2007); and Blomquist, Dinar and 
Kemper (2008) identify a number of political and institutional factors which may be 
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associated with the emergence, sustainability and success or failure of decentralization 
initiatives of the river basins at the basin level. The various factors identified by the 
framework are derived from the institutional analysis literature relating to water and other 
natural resource management and to decentralized systems of governance (Agrawal, 
2002; Alaerts, 1999; Bromley, 1989; Easter and Hearne, 1993). The four major factors 
are: (a) contextual factors and initial conditions, (b) characteristics of decentralization 
process, (c) characteristics of central government/basin-level relationships and capacities, 
and (d) internal configuration of basin level institutional arrangements. Figure 2 below 
represents the theoretical framework proposed by Blomquist, Dinar and Kemper (2005), 
Dinar et al. (2007) and Blomquist, Dinar and Kemper (2008). 
 
Figure 2. Diagram of theoretical framework. Source: Adapted from Dinar et al. (2007) 
As shown in figure 2 above, for a river basin decentralization process, there are various 
factors, mainly those listed in the scheme, that will influence the outcome of the 
decentralization initiative. It is necessary to note that these factors are not directly linked 
to the decentralization initiative success or failure, but influence incentives and 
conditions that are linked to the success or failure of basin management. In the following 
Initial and contextual 
Conditions 
Characteristics of the 
decentralization process 
Characteristics of central 
government/basin-level 
relationships and capacities 






















paragraphs we describe the factors appearing in figure 2 above and their impact on the 
outcomes of river basin decentralization initiatives (Blomquist et al. 2008).  
Contextual Factors and Initial Conditions: Empirical evidences from natural resource 
management studies suggest that the initial conditions, which are primarily elements of 
the socio-economic setting that prevailed at the time when decentralization initiative was 
attempted, represent an integral component and determining factor in the outcome of 
decentralization efforts. Pre-identified factors and conditions include: (a) the level of 
economic development within the nation, (b) the level of economic development within 
the catchment area, (c) the initial distribution of resources among basin stakeholders (d) 
the socio-cultural diversity among basin stakeholders, and (e) the local experience with 
self-governance and service provision.  
Musgrave (1997) found that the level of economic development of the nation was 
associated with successful decentralization in water sector. According to Blomquist, 
Dinar and Kemper (2005), the level of economic development of the nation is a key 
variable since it affects the financial capacity of the central government to bear transition 
costs associated with decentralization initiative and ongoing costs that support and 
facilitate basin scale management. The initial distribution of resources among basin 
stakeholders has been reported as a key variable affecting decentralization initiatives. 
Studies on natural resource management have also indicated that the initial distribution of 
resource among river basin stakeholders is crucial factor affecting decentralization 
process.  
Heterogeneous societies and particularly those with weak formal and informal institutions 
have lower trust and retarded economic performance compared to less heterogeneous 
societies.  Social and cultural diversity among stakeholders is an important factor, which 
may affect decentralization initiative outcome since it may affect communication and 
trust. Blomquist, Dinar and Kemper (2005) have pointed out that the ability of managing 
water resources will more likely depend on river basin stakeholders previous experience 
with other public services.   
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Dinar et al. (2007) also found that contextual factors and initial conditions affect 
significantly the nature of decentralization process and its performance. However, their 
results do not support that reach and well-endowed basin do necessarily have an 
advantage over less endowed basins. Their results indicated that stressed resource 
conditions (persistent water scarcity and quality) and the existence of multiple major 
problems can stimulate action towards decentralization reforms.  
Characteristics of the Decentralization Process: The main components affecting the 
outcomes of decentralization reforms include devolution of authority and responsibility 
from the centre, and acceptance of that authority and responsibility at the local level. Key 
factors include: (a) the type of devolution of decentralization process (top-down, bottom-
up and mutually desired), (b) incorporation or involvement of existing local governance 
arrangements and (c) consistent central government commitment.  
The type of devolution of decentralization process has been found to affect 
decentralization initiatives and their performance. In this regard, Blomquist et al. (2005a) 
report that bottom-up decentralization initiatives often lack a well defined legal role and 
mandate. On the order hand, Dinar et al. (2007) found that decentralization process, 
which is initiated by central government (top-down devolution), is likely to be inefficient 
and end in lower levels of decentralization performance. Empirical evidence has shown 
that a highly conflictual decentralization initiative was associated with poorer 
performance (Dinar et al., 2007). In order to have an efficient decentralization initiative, 
responsibility should be given to a level where stakeholders are empowered to participate 
in decision making about the management of the scarce resource (Van Wilgen et al., 
2003; Dinar et al., 2007). Therefore, successful implementation of a decentralization 
initiative may depend significantly on the devolution of authority and responsibility from 
the centre, and acceptance of the authority and responsibility by local stakeholders in the 
basin (Kemper, Blomquist and Dinar, 2007).  
Similarly, in order to reach integrated water resource management a broad cross section 
of stakeholders need to be involved to varying degrees in the planning, development, 
implementation and monitoring of water management activities given that participatory 
 11 
approaches enhance quality, ownership and sustainability of integrated water resource 
management and decrease water conflicts.  Blomquist, Dinar and Kemper (2005) report 
that stakeholder participation in decentralization initiative is likely to increase and be 
stable if local community governance institutions and practices are recognized and 
incorporated in decentralization process. The same authors note that a change in 
country’s government during decentralization process might produce changes in the 
decentralization policy, which can confuse the mission of government agencies involved 
in the decentralization process.    
Characteristics of Central Government/Basin-level Relationships and Capacities: As we 
described above, the success of decentralization initiatives seems to be a joint effort 
performed by the central government and local level government. In this section we 
identify other variables related to central-local government relationships. According to 
Blomquist, Dinar and Kemper (2005), these variables are: (a) The extent of actual 
devolution; (b) financial resources and autonomy at the basin level, (c) basin level 
authority to modify and create institutional arrangements, (d) distribution of national 
level political influence among stakeholder, (e) characteristics of water right system and 
(f) adequate time for implementation and adaptation.  
Blomquist, Dinar and Kemper (1995) report that decentralization process announced by 
the government can be symbolic (written documents advocating participation of local 
stakeholder while in practice the government has control over significant resource 
management decisions). Vermillion and Garces-Restropo (1998) found that symbolic and 
abandonment policies are more likely to result in low performance of decentralization 
process.  
Dinar et al. (2007) found that basin with higher budget per capita are not necessarily 
more successful and Blomquist, Dinar and Kemper (1995) also note that basin level 
authority should be endowed with resource and have authority over those resources but a 
complete transfer of financial responsibility from central government to local authority 
might produce undesirable results. Dinar et al. (2007) conclude that a combination of 
financial responsibility given to local authorities, financial autonomy (basin revenues 
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remaining at the basin-level) and central government support is more likely to increase 
the performance of river basin decentralization process. 
Finally, basin level authority to modify and create institutional arrangements is a key 
variable since the ability of local authority to design their own institutional arrangements 
is more likely to attract more active involvement from basin-level stakeholders 
(Blomquist, Dinar and Kemper, 2005). The same authors report that the relationship 
between time for implementation of decentralization process and the success of 
decentralization is complex. However, adequate time is needed to adjust changes and 
stabilize the decentralization process.    
Internal Configuration of Basin-level Institutional Arrangements: Basin-level and local-
level institutional arrangements established by basin-level stakeholders and/or central 
government officials make up the final set of variables deemed critical in the successful 
implementation of river basin decentralization initiative. Indicators falling under this 
category include: (a) presence of basin-level governance institutions, (b) clarity of 
institutional boundaries, and their match with basin boundaries, (c) recognition of basin-
level communities of interest by basin-level institutional arrangements, (d) availability of 
forums for information sharing and communication and (e) availability of forums for 
conflict resolution.  
Regarding the first indicator, Ostrom (1990) has indicated that the presence of basin-level 
governance institutions is a key variable to sustain successful resource preservation and 
efficient use. The same author has found clarity of institutional boundaries, and their 
match with basin boundaries, to be a feature of long-enduring common-pool resource 
management. The recognition of basin-level communities of interest by basin-level 
institutional arrangements is key variable since it is likely to increase the participation of 
river basin stakeholders in decentralization process. Forums for sharing information and 
communication as well as forums for conflict resolution are key variables affecting 
decentralization performance since their reduce information asymmetries and promote 
cooperation. 
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3  Analytical Institutional Economic Framework  
The analytical model is based on the model developed by Blomquist, Dinar and Kemper 
(2005), Dinar et al. (2007) and Blomquist, Dinar and Kemper (2008) and depicted by 
figure 2 above. This approach is appropriate here since it includes various institutional 
variables and their possible impact on the outcome of the decentralization reform. The 
approach allows for micro level analysis, given that it is capable at analysing a 
decentralization process and performance at a single river basin level.  As described in 
the introduction section of this study, the main objective of this study is to access the 
river basin decentralization process and its performance under varying institutional 
settings in Mozambique, South Africa and Zimbabwe.  
The relationship between river basin decentralization process and institutional variables is 
given as: 
),,,( XIGCfD = ,                                                                                                           (1) 
where D represents a vector of variables indicating the characteristics of the river basin 
decentralization process (such as length of decentralization, number of institutions 
created and dismantled, etc.), C is a vector of variables representing contextual factors 
and initial conditions involved in the reform process (such as river basin GDP and 
revenues), G is a vector of variables representing the characteristics of central 
government/basin-level relationships and capacities (such as the nature of distribution of 
river basin management responsibilities), I is a vector of variables indicating internal 
configuration of basin-level institutional arrangements (such as the organgram of the 
basin organization) and X is a vector of other variables associated with the specific river 
basin (such as river basin size, population etc.). 
Following Dinar et al. (2007), we evaluate decentralization process (vector D in equation 
1 above) using the following variables: (i) the length of decentralization process, (ii) the 
transaction costs of the decentralization process measured by several variables such as 
institutions created and dismantled during decentralization process and (iii) the level of 
involvement of the river basin stakeholders in the decentralization process. 
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Contextual factors and initial conditions (vector C in equation 1 above) can be indicated 
by the following variables: (a) the level of economic development within the nation, (b) 
the level of economic development within the catchment area, (c) the initial distribution 
of resources among basin stakeholders (d) the socio-cultural diversity among basin 
stakeholders and (e) the local experience with self-governance and service provision. 
Being everything equal, we expect economically developed basins to achieve a successful 
decentralization process than not economically developed basins. Moreover, holding 
everything else constant, we also expect basins with homogeneous societies and 
particularly those with strong formal and informal institutions to have a successful 
decentralization process compared to basins with heterogeneous societies and with weak 
formal and informal institutions. 
According to Blomquist, Dinar and Kemper (2005), the variables under the category of 
characteristics of central government/basin-level relationships and capacities (vector G in 
equations 1 above) are: (a) the extent of devolution of responsibilities and decision 
making; (b) financial autonomy and financial resources at the basin level, (c) basin level 
authority to modify and create institutional arrangements, (d) distribution of national 
level political influence among stakeholders, (e) characteristics of water right system and 
(f) adequate time for implementation and adaptation. All other things being equal, we 
expect decentralization process to be successful when autonomy and or flexibility 
(technical and financial) are given to local river basin organizations. Additionally, 
holding everything else constant, decentralization process is expected to succeed if 
complete central government funds be managed by central government and complete 
local-river basin funds being managed by local-river basins. Finally, everything else 
being equal, we expect success on river basin reforms if local stakeholders are able to 
create and implement institutional arrangements for resource managements including 
cross-jurisdictional arrangements. 
Internal configuration of basin-level institutional arrangements is indicated by the 
following variables: (a) presence of basin-level governance institutions, (b) clarity of 
institutional boundaries, and their match with basin boundaries, (c) recognition of basin-
level communities of interest by basin-level institutional arrangements, (d) availability of 
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forums for information sharing and communication and (e) availability of forums for 
conflict resolution. Holding everything else equal, we expect the decentralization process 
to be successful when information sharing and communication among stakeholders are 
apparent. Without influence of other things, we also expect to have a decentralized water 
resource management more likely in settings where forums for conflict resolution exist. 
The relationship between river basin decentralization performance and institutional 
variables is given as: 
),,,,( XIGDCgP =                                                                                                          (2) 
Where P is a vector of river basin decentralization performance indicators and the other 
variables are defined as described above. 
We assess the river basin decentralization performance3 using the following variables: (a) 
the level of accomplishment of the river basin objectives, (b) the degree at which stressed 
resource conditions have been affecting the river basin stakeholders before and after the 
decentralization process and (c) the level of authority given to different stakeholders to 
manage river basin resources before and after the decentralization process.  We expect 
high decentralization performance if the objectives of decentralization process were 
accomplished, if the condition of the stressed river basin resources has been improved 
and if more river basin management decisions are made at lower levels after the 
decentralization than before decentralization.   
The main variables serving as the contextual factors and initial conditions including the 
characteristics of the river basin decentralization process, characteristics of central 
government/basin-level relationships and capacities as well as internal configuration of 
basin-level institutional arrangements are those described above.  
In respect to the characteristics of decentralization process, holding everything else equal, 
we will expect decentralization performance to be high if decentralization process 
                                                 
3 River basin decentralization performance measures the level of attaining several original goals of 
decentralization process. River basin decentralization progress can also be measured by comparing 
performance before and after decentralization process on key variables.  
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follows bottom-up process or mutual agreement between central government and local 
stakeholders. Additionally, we expect decentralization performance to be high if new 
institutions created through decentralization were built from the existing traditional based 
organizations. The direction of impact of variables regarding contextual factors and initial 
conditions, characteristics of central government/basin-level relationships and capacities 
as well as internal configuration of basin-level institutional arrangements on 
decentralization performance is similar to the direction of impact of these variables on 
decentralization process described above. 
4 Data Collection, Empirical Specification and Data Analysis 
This study uses a case study approach and is based on both primary and secondary data. 
The units of analysis are the selected river basins, namely the Inkomati basin in South 
Africa, the Mzingwane basin in Zimbabwe, and the Mozambican portion of the Limpopo 
basin, which is under the management of ARA-Sul. The data were collected in the three 
selected river basins using a structured questionnaire4. This study employed a non 
random (purposive) sampling, which consists of selecting respondents in a deliberative 
fashion in order to achieve certain objectives (Prinsloo, 2008). For example, respondents 
with best knowledge and experience in river basin decentralization process were 
deliberately chosen to answer the questionnaire used in this study since the main 
objective of the study is to access the impact of institutional factors on river basin 
decentralization process and its performance. This technique is appropriate in case studies 
where a small sample composed of key informants is selected from the target population 
(Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2007).  
 
The number of survey respondents varied among the three river basins5. In the Inkomati 
river basin, 25 key informants representing different stakeholder groups were 
interviewed. The interviewees included the Inkomati catchment management agency 
senior staffs, agents from the Department of Water Afairs Regional Office in 
                                                 
4 The questionnaire is composed of five major sections, namely 1) river basin organization identification, 2) 
river basin characteristics, 3) decentralization process, 4) decentralization performance and 5) basin 
comparisons. It can be obtained upon request. 
5 The survey respondents were not able to answer all survey questions and therefore, one questionnaire was 
filled in each basin using data provided by different survey respondents and taken from secondary sources.   
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Mpumalanga, the Department of Agriculture in Mpumalanga, the local municipalities of 
Ehlanzeni District and Bushbuckridge, the Bushbuckridge Water Board, a private water 
and sewerage services company: Silulumansi-Sembcorp, the South African Local 
Government Association (SALGA), Irrigation Boards and Water User Associations 
(WUAs). Emerging farmers and other farmer organizations were also interviewed. Other 
industry players like, Tsb Sugar, Eskom and mining companies like Fairview mine which 
is part of Barberton mines were also interviewed. This ensured both spatial coverage as 
well as demographic and socio economic diversity of the respondents. 
 
In Mzingwane river basin, the unit of analysis was the water user association. In total, 
125 key informants from different water user associations were interviewed out of which 
8 questionnaires were discarded on the basis of repeating the same water user association 
or provision of incomplete information. Finally, in the Limpopo river basin, 21 key 
respondents were interviewed. The target group interviewed in Limpopo river basin was 
composed of current and former leaders of the National Directorate of water (DNA), 
ARA-Sul officials and Water Users Associations. In the three countries, secondary data 
were collected form different governmental, non governmental and private institutions 
related to water sector.  
 
Empirical Specification 
In this study, we do not apply quantitatively the framework presented above because of 
the limited number of observation for each variable (one questionnaire was filled in each 
river basin by combining the answers from different respondents). Different from 
quantitative approaches, a case study methodology does not estimate the impacts of 
institutional variables on river basin decentralization process and its performance. It 
highlights the direction of river basin decentralization process and its performance taking 
into account the considered institutional variables.  In this section, we describe the river 
basin decentralization process variables (vector D in equations 1 and  2 above) and 
performance variables (vector P in equation 2 above) as well as institutional economics 
variables (vectors C, G, I and X in equations 1 and 2 above) and then we describe the 
methods that are used to analyze the data.  
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Decentralization process variables: The variables in this category are: (i) the length of 
decentralization process which is captured by the number of years during which the 
decentralization took place, (ii) the transaction costs of the decentralization process, 
which are represented by the number of institutions created or dismantled during 
decentralization process, (iii) the level of involvement of the river basin stakeholders in 
the decentralization process, which is indicated by the involvement of local people on the 
development of water laws and functionality of river basin organizations, (iv) the type of 
devolution of decentralization process  which is represented by if the decentralization 
process followed a top-down, bottom-up and or mutually desired process.  
 
River basin decentralization performance variables: The river basin decentralization 
performance variables used in the 3 studied river basins are: (a) the level of 
accomplishment of the river basin objectives, (b) the degree at which stressed resource 
conditions have been affecting the river basin stakeholders before and after the 
decentralization process and (c) the level of authority given to different stakeholders to 
manage river basin resources before and after the decentralization process.   
 
Contextual factors and initial conditions variables: The variables under this category are: 
the level of economic development of the country and river basin before decentralization 
initiative, which can be measured by country’s GDP and river basin GDP and revenues, 
river basin population density, which is captured by number of people at river basin and 
river basin area, river basin annual surface water, stakeholders’ share of river basin 
resources before decentralization process, which is captured from secondary data, and 
river basin stakeholders’ management capacity before decentralization initiative, which is 
indicated by river basin human capacity of managing water resources and the existence of 
capacity building programs for river basin stakeholders.  
 
Characteristics of central government/basin-level relationships and capacities variables: 
This category includes the following variables:  percentage of tariffs remaining at the 
basin, private sector participation in basin investment, sources of river basin budget, the 
level of authority of river basin stakeholders on managing river basin resources.  
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Internal configuration of basin-level institutional arrangements variables: Under this 
category we use the following variables: (i) river basin organizational structure including 
the composition of each organ and its function, (ii) information sharing variables within 
the basin and (iii) mechanisms for dispute resolution variables.  
 
Data analysis  
The variables presented above are analyzed qualitatively by using the comparative 
analysis method. Using this method, data are compared and contrasted with the existing 
literature. As we mentioned before, the case study approach does not estimate the impact 
of institutional variables on river basin decentralization process. It highlights the direction 
of the river basin decentralization process given the institutional factors. Specifically, for 
analyzing objective one (describe the factors that are potentially related to the 
development of decentralized river basin management in the three basins), we describe 
the decentralization process and we highlight its direction given the institutional factors.  
 
As described above, the variables composing the decentralization process (vector D in 
equations 1 and 2 above) are (i) the length of decentralization process, (ii) the transaction 
costs of the decentralization process, which is represented by the number of institutions 
created, dismantled during decentralization process, (iii) the level of involvement of the 
river basin stakeholders in the decentralization process, and (iv) the type of devolution of 
decentralization process. For each river basin, we assign a value of 0 or 1 for each of the 
four variables presented above. Each variable takes a value of 1 if its results contribute 
for a creation of decentralized river basin and 0 otherwise. The overall level of river basin 
decentralization process is obtained by adding the scores assigned to the four considered 
variables. Consequently the level of decentralization process increases in our analysis 
from 0 to 4. 
 
Similarly, in order to reach objective two (depict the factors that are potentially related to 
the performance of decentralized river basin management in the three countries), first we 
create the river basin decentralization performance indicators for the three river basins 
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using river basin decentralization performance variables. The variables composing the 
decentralization performance (vector P in equation 2 above) are (a) the level of 
accomplishment of the river basin objectives, (b) the degree at which stressed resource 
conditions have been affecting the river basin stakeholders before and after the 
decentralization process and (c) the level of authority given to different stakeholders to 
manage river basin resources before and after the decentralization process. For each river 
basin, we assign a value of 0 or 1 for each of the three variables presented above. Each 
variable takes a value of 1 if its results contribute for the increase of river basin 
performance and 0 otherwise. The overall level of river basin decentralization 
performance is obtained by adding the scores assigned to the three considered variables. 
Therefore, the level of decentralization performance increases in our analysis from 0 to 3.  
5 Results 
This section compares the experiences of decentralization process and performance of the 




Table 1 below presents the results of decentralization process of the three river basins. 
Specifically, table 1 summarizes the results regarding (i) the length of decentralization 
process, (ii) the transaction costs of the decentralization process, which is represented by 
the number of institutions created, dismantled during decentralization process, (iii) the 
level of involvement of the river basin stakeholders in the decentralization process and 
(iv) the type of devolution of decentralization process for the three river basins.  
 
The length of decentralization process: Table 1 below shows that all basins have 
implemented decentralization process and the number of years that decentralization has 
been underway varies in the three river basins. The length of time needed to complete a 
decentralization process is difficult to establish. Blomquist, Dinar and Kemper (2005) 
report that adequate time is needed to adjust changes and stabilize the decentralization 
process.   Hence, all basins are assigned a value of 1.0 (see the number within parenthesis 
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in the first line of table 1) because all of them have been under decentralization for more 
than 5 years.  
 
Number of institutions created, dismantled during decentralization process: Table 1 
reveals that decentralization has created local level institutions in the three river basins 
and therefore, all basins are assigned the value of 1.0. 
 
The level of involvement of the river basin stakeholders in the decentralization process: 
Table 1 show that the level of involvement of river basin stakeholders in river basin 
decentralization process varies among the three river basins. River basin stakeholders are 
more involved in decentralization process in Inkomati river basin compared to 
Mzingwane and Limpopo river basins. The involvement of river basin stakeholders in 
decentralization process is weak in Mzingwane and Limpopo river basins. Therefore, 
Inkomati river basin is assigned a value of 1.0 while the other basins are assigned the 
value of 0.0. 
 
  The type of devolution of decentralization process:  Inkomati is assigned a value of 1.0 
while the other basins are assigned the value of 0.0 since Inkomati river basin followed a 
bottom-up approach while other basins followed a top-down approach.  
The strengths of decentralization process in all basins are supported by the creation of 
catchment management agencies. The positive outcomes of Inkomati river basin 
decentralization process might be associated with the type of devolution (bottom-up 
process towards mutually desired process) followed in the decentralization process. 
Blomquist, Dinar and Kemper (2005) report that stakeholders’ participation is key factor 
associated with the level of decentralization. The level of decentralization process is more 
likely to increase in settings where local people participate in decentralization initiative.  
 
However, the Inkomati river basin has not yet been fully decentralized. This fact is 
supported by the existence of only two water user associations which are not fully 
operational out of 27 irrigator boards that are supposed to be transformed to Water User 
Associations. Additionally, the weaknesses of decentralization process in Inkomati river 
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basin might be explained by the lack of financial resources managed by the river basin 
organizations since water tariffs are still collected by the Regional Office of Water 
Affairs. Dinar et al. (2007) report that river basins with financial autonomy are likely to 
be more decentralized than river basins without financial autonomy.  
 
The attempt to decentralized Mzingwane river basin seems to have resulted in 
deconcentration. This is because Mzingwane river basin organizations such as Zimbabwe 
National Water Authority (ZINWA), Catchment and Sub-Catchment are mainly 
government controlled rather than local stakeholders’ based organizations. The type of 
devolution (top down approach), the lack of involvement of river basin stakeholders in 
basin management  as well as limited financial resources are more likely to be associated 
with the realized outcomes of Mzingwane river basin decentralization process. 
 
Similar to Mzingwane river basin, the attempt to decentralize Limpopo river basin seems 
to have resulted in deconcentration. This is because Limpopo river basin organizations 
such as Limpopo river basin management unity (UGBL), Chokwe Hydraulic Public 
Enterprise HCEP and Baixo Limpopo Irrigation Scheme BLIS are mainly government 
controlled rather than local stakeholders’ based organizations. The institutional factors 
that might be associated with the outcome of Limpopo river basin decentralization 
process might be the lack of involvement of local stakeholders on the development of 
local organizations and the lack of financial resources to be used for the management of 
river basin resources at basin level.   
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Table 1. Summary of Decentralization Process in the Three River Basins 
Decentralization process   Inkomati River Basin   Mzingwane River Basin   Limpopo River Basin 
Length of decentralization 





Decentralization created Inkomati 
Catchment Management Agency 
and two water user associations 
(Elands and Upper Komati). 
Twenty five irrigation boards are 
in process to be dismantled and to 
become Water User Associations. 
(1.0) 
 
Decentralization dismantled the 
Department of Water and 
Development including its local 
representations and created and 
created Ministry of Water Resources 
and Rural Development, ZINWA, 
Catchment and Subcachment 




Directorate for water and 
national water agencies at 
national level and created GBL, 
HICEP, BLIS and Water user 
associations at local level. (1.0) 
Level of involvement of the 
river basin stakeholders in 
the decentralization process  
 
Local stakeholders are involved 
in decentralization process. 
Examples include the 
involvement of commercial 
farmers and other stakeholders in 
drafting water laws as well as the 
diversity in the composition of 
ICMA board. (1.0) 
 
Local stakeholders are not involved 
in decentralization process. 
Examples include the creation of 
ZINWA that was solely made by the 
government and the selection of 
stakeholders to river basin 
organization boards that are mainly 
performed by ZINWA and the 
government. (0.0) 
 
Local stakeholders are not 
involved in decentralization 
process. Examples include the 
creation of ARA-Sul that was 
solely performed by the 
government and the selection of 
stakeholders to boards of basin 
level organizations (HICEP, 
BLIS, and UGBL) that is mainly 
performed by the central 
government. (0.0) 
Type of devolution of 
decentralization process.   Bottom-up (1.0)   Top-down (0.0)   Top-down (0.0) 
Note: The number within parenthesis represents the score assigned for each decentralization process variable. Each variable takes a value of 1.0 if its results 






Table 2 below presents the summary of results of decentralization performance. 
Specifically, table 2 summarizes (a) the level of accomplishment of the river basin 
objectives, (b) the degree at which stressed resource conditions have been affecting the 
river basin stakeholders before and after the decentralization process and (c) the level of 
authority given to different stakeholders to manage river basin resources before and after 
the decentralization process for the three river basins. 
 
The level of accomplishment of the river basin objectives: the results presented in table 2 
indicated that Inkomati and Mzingwane river basins have reached partially the river basin 
organization (RBOs) objectives while in Limpopo river basin the level of 
accomplishment of RBOs objectives is unknown. These results suggest a value of 1.0 for 
Inkomati and Mzingwane river basins and 0.0 for Limpopo river basin. As mentioned in 
the data analysis section, the value of 1.0 is assigned in Inkomati and Mzingwane river 
basins because the accomplishment of some RBOs objectives contributes to an increase 
in the performance of the decentralization process of these basins.  
 
Regarding the degree at which stressed resource conditions have been affecting the river 
basin stakeholders before and after the decentralization process, all basins have improved 
the conditions of stressed river basin resources. However, decentralization of Mzingwane 
and Limpopo river basins has worsened the conditions of some stressed basin resources 
such as land degradation and river ecology. This outcome put the Mzingwane and 
Limpopo river basin lagging behind in performance indicator comparing to Inkomati 
river basin.  Hence, Inkomati river basin is assigned a value of 1.0 while each of the two 








Note: The number within parenthesis represents the score assigned for each decentralization performance variable. Each variable takes a value of 1.0 if its results 
contribute to an increase in performance of decentralization process and 0.0 otherwise. 
Table 2. Summary of Decentralization Performance in the Three River Basins. 
Decentralization 
Performance Inkomati River Basin   Mzingwane River Basin   Limpopo River Basin 
Degree of accomplishment 
of original objectives of 
river basin decentralization 
process 
The RBOs have the following objectives: 
improve water scarcity and water conflicts as 
well as assuring water quality. 
Decentralization process improved by 25% 
the problems related to water scarcity and 
conflicts and by 50% the problems related to 
water quality. (1.0) 
 
The RBOs have the following objectives: 
reduce water conflicts and improve equitable 
allocation of water permits. Decentralization 
decreased water conflict problem by 75% and 
did not improve water allocation. (1.0) 
 
The RBOs have the following 
objectives: improve water 
allocation and distribution and 
crop production. The level of 
achievement of these objectives 
is unknown. (0) 
Comparing of the level of 
problems related to river 
basin stressed resources 
before and after 
decentralization process.  
Decentralization initiative did not change the 
state of problems related to water scarcity, 
floods, environmental quality, land 
degradation (erosion, salinity, etc) and river 
ecology but improved the availability of 
water and reduced water conflicts.  (1.0) 
 
Decentralization process decreased the 
problems related to water scarcity, water 
conflicts and water conservation and storage 
and increased problem related to river ecology 
and land degradation. (0.0)  
 
Decentralization improved 
availability of water and 
increased problems related to 
land degradation and water 
conflicts. (0.0) 
Level of authority given to 
different stakeholders to 
manage river basin 
resources before and after 
the decentralization process 
Responsibilities regarding water 
administration, water quality enforcement 
and water quantity management are equally 
shared by both local organizations and 
government agencies after the 
implementation of decentralization process. 
Decentralization initiative did not improve 
the participation of local organization in 
management of infrastructure financing and 
setting water quality standards. Management 
activities related to awarding water rights, 
water allocation, modeling and forecasting 
water availability, monitoring and enforcing 
water quality and collecting water tariffs are 
performed by Regional Office of the 
Department of Water Affairs. (1.0) 
  
Responsibilities regarding water 
administration are performed by both local 
government (25%) and local river basin 
organization (75%). Decentralization initiative 
did not improve the participation of local 
organization in management of infrastructure 
financing, water quality enforcement and 
setting water standards. Decentralization 
changed water rights to two years renewable 
water permits. Management activities 
regarding to water allocation, modeling and 
forecasting water availability, monitoring and 
enforcing water quality and collecting water 
tariffs are performed by ZINWA. (1.0) 
  
Management activities related to 
infrastructure financing, water 
quality enforcement and setting 
water standards are performed 
by central government. After 
decentralization, management 
activities related to water 
administration are performed by 
local government (25%) and 
river basin organizations (75%). 
(1.0) 
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Concerning the level of authority given to different stakeholders to manage river basin resources, 
river basin decentralization has allowed river basin organizations of the three basins to be 
involved in the management of basin resources and mainly water administration. Infrastructure 
financing, water quality enforcement and collection of water tariffs are sill being performed by 
government in the three river basins. These results indicate that decentralization of these basins 
has been increasing its performance since local RBOs are now responsible for the management 
of some river basin activities and therefore all basins are assigned a value of 1.0.   
 
Table 3 below presents the overall score measuring the decentralization process and performance 
of the three studied river basins.  
Table 3. Level of Decentralization Process and Performance of 
the Three River Basins 
River Basins Decentralization Process 
Decentralization 
Performance 
Inkomati 4 3 
Mzingwane 2 2 
Limpopo 2 1 
   
 
The results in the table 3 above show that the overall evaluation of decentralization process result 
with a value of 4.0 for Inkomati river basin and 2.0 for Mzingwane and Limpopo river basins. 
Table 3 also shows that Inkomati river basin is performing better (overall score of 3.0) 
comparing to Mzingwane and Limpopo river basins. Mzingwane river basin is performing better 
(overall score of 2.0) than Limpopo river basin (overall score of 1.0). 
 
This is supported by the existence of government commitment into decentralization in Inkomati 
river basin. Chibwe (2011) reports that Inkomati CMA has been receiving funds from the 
government to implement river basin activities which is not evidently happening in Mzingwane 
and Limpopo river basins. The better performance of Inkomati and Mzingwane river basin 
compared to Limpopo river basin is supported by the accomplishment of some river basin 
activities in these basins. Chibwe (2011) and Musinake (2011) report that the stakeholders of 
Inkomati and Mzingwane river basins have developed catchment plan while the stakeholders of 
Limpopo river basin has not yet accomplished a major river basin activity. 
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6 Conclusions, Limitations of the Study and Policy Implications 
 
This study shows that attempts to decentralize river basin management have been demonstrated 
in Inkomati, Mzingwane and Limpopo river basins. These attempts are supported by the 
ratifications of water laws, which have created river basin level institutions (organizations and 
other mechanisms) to manage river basin. Examples of local level organizations include the 
Inkomati Catchment Management Agency in the Inkomati river basin, the Zimbabwe National 
Water Authority in the Mzingwane river basin and the Limpopo River Basin Management Unity 
in the Limpopo river basin. Examples of mechanisms which facilitate the management of river 
basin management is the existence of systems for information sharing among stakeholders which 
are commonly performed using basin meetings.  
 
One important finding from the study is that, none of the studied river basins can be considered 
fully decentralized. The decentralization processes vary among the studied river basins. While 
the Inkomati river basin is more decentralized, the process is lagging behind in the Mzingwane 
and Limpopo river basins. Institutional factors seem to be the key drivers of these differences. 
The positive outcomes of the Inkomati river basin decentralization process are linked to the type 
of devolution (mutually desired process) followed in the decentralization process, which resulted 
in the involvement of local stakeholders. The lower outcomes of decentralization process in the 
Mzingwane and Limpopo river basins are associated with the type of devolution (top down 
approach), which resulted in the lack of involvement of river basin stakeholders.  
 
Similar to decentralization process, the results regarding the performance of the decentralization 
initiatives in the three river basins is mixed. Although river basin organizations of the three river 
basins do not have financial management autonomy, the Inkomati river basin seems to be 
performing better comparing to other basins and the Mzingwane river basin seems to perform 
better than the Limpopo river basin. Participation of stakeholders in the management of river 
basin resources has been the crucial factor determining these differences. It is important to note 
that the establishment of participatory mechanisms in decision making involves shifting power 
from central government to the basin level. Country governments of the studied river basins have 
showed willingness to have decentralized river basin management. However concentration of 
power seems to be the key factor that negatively impacted the performance of the studied river 
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basins. Efforts of Zimbabwean government to manage Mzingwane river basin through 
concentrating power on Zimbabwe Water Authority (ZINWA) and the endeavor of Mozambican 
government to concentrate power on the river basin organizations (UGBL, HCEP, and BLIS) 
have negatively prevented the participation of local stakeholders on river basin management and 
consequently conduced the decentralization attempt into deconcentration process. 
  
Finally, it is important to highlight that the process of decentralization reforms requires years, 
even decades and therefore central governments should be prepared to extend their commitment 
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